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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JAEGER AND BRANCH, INC. a 
corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs. 
JIM PAPPAS dba JIM PAPPAS 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Defendant- Appellant·· 
Case No. 
10885 
Appeal from a Judgment against the Defendant 
Granted by the Third District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, Honorable Leonard W. Elton, 
Judge, Presiding. 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Respondent, taking the position of a 
holder in due course of a check in the face 
... 
' 
!.·· 
I 
I . 
" ' ., 
amount of $6,500.00 has brought suit against the! 
I 
maker of the check, the maker asserting the claiu 
that because of certain conversations between 
the maker and the holder, prior to writing of 
the check, placed the duty upon the holder to 
investigate the circumstances giving rise ·to 
the check before accepting the same. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
The parties having stipulated in chambers 
that the respondent, by introducing the check sued 
upon into evidence, had presented a prima facie 
case, that respondent was the holder in due course, 
and the appellant then having presented his evidenc~ 
and the respondent then having moved the Court for 
judgment in its favor on the grounds that the Appel-
lant did not present a defense, the Court granted 
judgment in respondent's favor for the sum of 
$6,500.00, with interest thereon at the rate of 6% 
per annum from January 18, 1966, plus costs. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment of 
the District Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent does not agree with appellant's 
statement of facts. It is to be noted at this point 
that respondent had introduced no testimony other 
than the 2 pages of testimony of W. W. KIMBALL, 
TR 21, 22 and 23. The testimony upon which the 
lower Court made is decision was that of appellant's 
and not respondent's. However, that testimony, far 
from being undisputed, was weighed and accepted and ,., 
rejected by the trial Court by the standards of 
its consistency and ultimately, its credibility. 
Respondent disagrees with the following 
statements of fact made by appellant: 
1. On page 3 of appellant's brief, there i1 
no indication that the two deliveries referred to 
therein were to be the last deliveries (TR 51, 
L 13-14). 
2. Again on page 3 of appellant's brief, 
the check was not forwarded as a payment for the 
goops to be received,but for working capital (TR74, 
lines 2 through 6). 
3. Again on page 3, respondent disagrees 
with appellant's statement. The evidence shows ap-
pellant had told ALLO that payment on the check 
would be stopped only after the check had been 
delivered to ALLO by appellant, and only after, it 
had been in turn negotiated by ALLO to respondent. 
It is to be noted that on TR 51, lines 6 and 7, 
appellant testified that "I have sent you a company 
check"; yet, at the time of that conversation, the 
check had not been written. Appellant clarifies 
this language later on, on TR 51, lines 18 through 
20, when he states that it was Monday morning, Jan-· 
~uary 11, 1966 when he said, "ff that truck is not 
here Tuesday morning, I am going to stop payment 
on the check". 
4. The telephone calls alluded to on page 
3 of appellant's brief did not take place on Januar:;: I 
12, but took place on January 11, 1966 (TR 55), be-• 
fore the check was written. 
5. On page 4 of appellant's brief, there 
was no testimony whatsoever that ALLO DISTRIBUTING 1' 
"agreed to ship an additional truckload of merchan- i' 
dise". The only testimony on TR 43, lines 24 to 
27, was that "there was the 13 rolls of carpeting 
yet to be received .... ". 
,. 
:· 
ii· 
6. Again, on page 5 of Appellant's brief, 
respondent clearly told appellant that respondent 
was owed money by ALLO (TR 80, lines 25 ,26 and 27). 1' 
ill 
7. On page 9 of appellant's brief, appell- ~l 
:;Ir 
ant states that the "final shipment was not receivec{i 
There is no evidence as to what the final shipment I 
was; therefore, obviously no evidenc~~s to whether [ 
I 
or not it was received.(TR 51, lines 13 and 14) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Inasmuch as neither appellant nor respondent 
has designated the exhibits on this appeal, neither 
lfthe parties may rely upon them, but must confine 
their arguments to the transcript and the record on 
-- I 
appeal before this Honorable Court. 
This statement of facts which will follow, 
will be presented in chronological order. 
Prior to January 12, 1966, ALLO DISTRIBUT-
ING, who is not a party to this litigation, had, 
pursuant to some agreements which are not before 
this Court, been selling merchandise to the appell-
ant (TR 29, lines 5 through 7). There is no evidenc 1 
before this Court as to what the nature of the re-
lationship was between ALLO and appellant, other 
than supplier and purchaser, nor what the terms of 
the purported agreerrents between ALLO and appellant 
were. 
There was never any agreements between re-
spondent and appellant (TR 59, line 27). 
On January 11, 1966, and before the subject. 
check was written, the appellant and his "interior 
decorator", who held no official position with 
defendant (TR 25, lines 27 and 28; TR 62, lines 28 
through 30; TR 63, lines 1 through 11; TR 35, lines 
24 through 30; TR 36, lines 1 through 4), and whose 
duties and authority as an interior decorator were 
unclear and uncertain, had four conversations with 
respondent's agent, DON MORELAND. It is to be 
noted that all of these co~ersations with appellant 
) took place before the. check was written on January 12 
1 12, 1966 (TR 49; TR 53, line 11; TR 55, lines 5 
through 8; TR 61, line 30; TR 63, line 30; TR 64, 
lines 1 through 2; TR 77, lines 4 and 5; TR 82, 
lines 25 through 29). 
The purpose of the conversations with res-
pondent was to determine (1) if JAEGER & BRANCH had 
been paid, and (2) if respondent was holding up the 
shipment of carpeting (TR 49, lines 3 through 11). 
It is uncertain whether or not appellant succeeded 
in having his inquiries answered. On page TR 49, 
lines 26 through 30, appellant testified that MORE-
LAND couldn't tell him what the status of the relat- Ii 
ionship or the accounts were between respondent and 
ALLO, that possibly, on TR 50, line 5, MORELAND was 
either "real happy with the deal" or "had been paid · 
in full" or that the interior decorator had been tol 
by MORELAND prior to January 12, 1966, that.money 
was still owed (TR 80, lines 25 through 27). 
It is critical to note what was not said 
during these four conversations between appellant 
and respondent; namely, there was no mention of the 
check, and obviously then neither was there any men-
tio~ of the maker, the payee, the amount, the drawer - -6-
or the date of the check, nor was there any mention : 
of any conditions of delivery of said check, nor the 
consideration for the check. At the time of these 
conversations, the check had not yet been written. 
The check was written on January 12, 1966 (Pre-Trial 
Order TR 6). 
On January 12, 1966, after the conversations· 
with respondent, appellant executed the subject 
check (Pre-Trial Order TR 6). 
There is nothing in the record to indicate 
that the check was not regular or unconditional on 
its face (TR 69). 
There is nothing in the record to indicate 
that the check was delivered to the payee, ALLO, 
with a cover letter or written memoranda implying 
conditions upon the delivery (TR 69, lines 13 and 
I' 
,. 
" 
,1. 
14). As a matter of fact, Appellant did not tell thE' 
payee either in writing or by word of mouth what 
to do with the check (TR 75, lines 27 through 30). 
Question: "Did you tell them what he should or 
should not do with the check?" Answer: "No. I im-
agine he (ALLO) was going to cash it." Question: 
II y d•d I ou l. n t tell him not to cash it?" Answer: "I 
should say not." Question: ''You didn't tell him not 
-7-
---
to negotiate it?" Answer: "No." 
It is obvious that the trial Court chose to 
disbelieve appellant's claim made in paragraph 3 
of its Answer (TR 3) which reads: " And the deliver): 
of the check was conditioned upon shipment of addit-: 
ional items of equipment and furniture forthwith by' 
ALLO DISTRIBUTING COMPANY, which ALLO failed to do.,. 
The trial Court in choosing to disbelieve appellant•· 
claim relied in part on the foregoing and the follo~· 
ing testimony: Question: "And you told them that thl 
reason you were sending the check for $6,000.00 
is for them to get the carpet released?" Answer: 
"The reason I told them that I was going to send 
them the $6,000.00 is that they had to pay all of 
their bills, everything had been paid for, and 
they needed some operating capital and it would 
very much if they had $6,000.00." (TR 75, lines 
50, TR 76, lines 1-6). 
that, 
I 
hel1: 
I 
29- ' 
The strongest language upon which appellant 
can rely is the appellant's testimony of purported 1 
conversation with ALLO in which appellant attempts 
to establish a conditional delivery. "I told them 
I would send him the check on those conditions". 
What appellant never testified is what those condi-
1 
i 
-8-
tions were. Instead appellant testified on (TR 75, 
lines 27-30) that appellant didn't tell the payee, 
ALLO, not to cash the check, or what to do with the 
check, but presumed that ALLO would cash the check. ·I 
Pursuant to stipulation (TR 21, lines 6-9) 
made in Chambers at the time of trial (TR 12), and 
the Pre-Trial Order (TR 6), it was stipulated that 
the check was delivered to respondent by ALLO on 
January 14, 1966, and that respondent's, prima facie' 
took the check as a holder in due course. 
The carpeting was released on the very same 
day that the check was negotiated to respondent, 
on January 14, 1966 (TR 60, lines 10-14 and lines 
20 and 21). 
,1. 
There is no testimony of any communications, : 
lj' 
either by word of mouth or written communications, 
between appellant and respondent during the period 
of time after the check was written on January 12, 
1966. 
Payment was stopped on the check January 18, 
1966 (TR 22, line 9). 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1: The evidence is to be construed it 
favor of respondent. 
Appellant's assertion that the evidence is , 
'I 
to be construed in favor of the appellant on the 
force of an analogy of the case at bar with that of 
a Summary Judgment, is to fly in the face of logic •. 
I 
In a Summary Judgment context, the trial Court neve1 I 
had an opportunity to hear the testimony or to weigl 
1 
the credibility of the witnesses, and for that reas-
on every indulgence in the favor of the non-prevail-
ing parties is made. In the case at bar,however, 
the trial Court did have an opportunity to hear ·'1 
appellant's witness and to examine appellant's evid~I 
ence. The trial Judge, who was the trier of fact, ,I 
did have the opportunity to weigh the credibility ·11l 
of the appellant's claims, to hear the witness' 
voice, and to examine the witness' demeanor. It is 
respectfully submitted that this Court cannot sub-
stitute its judgment for that of the trial Court 
with respect to the weighing of the evidence. As 
stated in MC COLLUM vs. CLOTHIER 121 U.311, 241 
P 2d 468, the plaintiff having prevailed, is entit-
led to the benefit of the evidence viewed in the 
light most favorable to him, together with every 
inference and intendment fairly and reasonably aris-
ing there form. 
Point 2£ 1 Appellant having stipulated in the 
trt.d.1 Court that plaintiff was a holder in due coursi 
-1 ('\_ 
and had made out its case prima facie, cannot in-
voke the provisions of 70A-3-307 UCA, 1953. 
Counsel stipulated in Chambers, as is supper· 
ted by the record (12; TR 21, lines 1 - 9; TR 24, 
lines 27 and 28) that it was to be presumed that 
plaintiff was a holder in due course and had made 
its prima facie case by introducing the check into 
etvidence. It was agreed at the Court's suggestion 
and by counsel that to conserve the Court's time, 
appellant would proceed to rebutf respondent's prima: 
facie case as a holder in due course. 
Appellant now attempts to invoke the benefit ·1 
of 70A-3-307 UCA, 1953, and to place the burden of 
proof on respondent, in violation of the stipulation 
made before the trial court. '!be only explanation 
that respondent can find for this argument made by 
appellant, is that the author of the brief, Mr. M. 
BYRON FISHER was not the trial counsel and was not 
present in Court. 
An examination of the transcript reveals 
that the trial counsel for appellant, MR. BIRD, un-
derstood the stipulation, and conducted himself pur-
suant to that stipulation. '!be Court's attention is 
respectfully directed to (TR 32, R.30 and TR 33, L. 
1-8) which indicates that during our colloquy , the 
question was raised as to the relevancy of acts occur-
ring after the negotiation and endorsement of the checl< 
) 
by the payee to respondent. Appellant and respondent 
and the Court were proceeding, pursuant to the before-
said Stipulation, in essence, that unless appellant 
succeeded in rebutting the presumption that respondent 
ws a holder in due course, any evidence of acts oc-
curring after the delivery of the check were irrele-
vant, as the defense that those later acts would estab-
1 
lish would be cut off by the negotiation of the check · 
to the holder in due course. That is why (on TR 32 anc 
TR 33) when respondent's counsel objected to a ques-
l 
tion which sought information after the check was nego-1: 
tiated: "The check was negotiated on January 14; any-
thing happening after January 14 would be irrelevant 
for the purposes of this trial." Counsel for appel-
lant answered: "I grant that to be true." Counsel 
was merely, by their Stipulation, following the law 
enunciated in the case of Mann vso Andrus, 169 Cal Ap 
2d 455, 337 P. 2d 473, 476, in which the Court stated: 
"The acquisition by the plaintiff of the information 
concerning the infirmities, if any, in the. instrument 
after the time of purchase, does not affect his status 
as a holder in due course." 
Appellant had the burden of proof to rebut 
-12-
tne prima facie showing that respondent was a holder 
1 in due course. The trial court held that appellant 
did not sustain this burden of proof. 
Appellant introduced no evidence to the 
effect that respondent did not give value for the 
check. 
Appellant introduced no evidence that the 
check was irregular on its face. 
Appellant introduced no evidence that respon-
dent had any notice of any infirmity in the check. 
Appellant's only contention, both at the 
trial and on this appeal, is that respondent had a 1 
duty to investigate and to inquire, and that respon-
dent failed to comply with that duty. 
RESPONDENT WAS UNDER NO DUTY OR OBLIGATION 
TO INVESTIGATE THE CIRCUMSTANCES GIVING 
RISE TO THE EXECUTION OF THE CHECK 
Appellant has attempted to set forth the 
proposition that because of the four telephone calls 
between appellant and respondent prior to the execu-
tion of the check, respondent was placed under an 
obligation to investigate the circumstances giving 
rise to the execution of the check. Appellant's 
position is without merit. 
An analysis of the four telephone conversa-
tions reveals the following: 
1. The phone calls were initiated by appel-
lant. 
2. Respondent was reluctant to divulge its 
business relationship with its customer, ALLO, for 
fear of breaching its business ethics. 
3. That after appellant's tenacious inter-
rogation, respondent finally told appellant that 
respondent was owed money by its customer ALLO. 
4. Appellant admitted to respondent that 
appellant was not having difficulty with ALLO, but 
that appellant "just wanted to be sure that they 
[ALLO J weren't maintaining their end of the contract'': 
(TR 79, lines 11 - 17). 
5. Neither appellant nor his employee, Miss 
, Voorhees, ever mentioned the check to respondent, 
I 
since it had not been written. (TR 82, lines 25 - 30: 
I 
6. The testimony of appellant, although con· 
flicting, gives rise to the inference that at the 
time of the telephone conversations with respondent, 
on January 11, 1966, before the check was written, 
appellant had not consummated whatever agreement he 
had made with ALLO concerning the check. Appellant 
testified (TR 63, line 30; TR 64, lines 1 and 2): 
11At the time when Miss Voorhees called Donald 
-- -14-
Moreland, there was no checks wrote. There was no 
amount settled on." And again on (TR 59, lines 7 -
9): "Did you tell Don Moreland the amount of the 
checks you were about to pay ALLO DISTRIBUTING COM-
PANY? Answer: No, sir. There was no amounts set 
at that tirne. 11 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial 
Judge correctly concluded that at the time of the 
conversations between appellant and respondent, ap-
pellant had not yet made his "deal" with the payee 
ALLO. At the very least, the inference is present 
tha~ if appellant had made its deal with the payee 
ALLO, it did not communicate this fact to respondent 
After those phone conversations, when res-
pondent received the check, on January 14, 1966, and 
observed that the check was regular on its face, and 
observed that the check was written the day after 
the phone calls, January 12, 1966, there is no reaso 
in the world why respondent, acting as a reasonable 
man, should question the propriety of the check in 
the payee ALLO'S handso The reasonable inference, 
it is submitted, is that after the phone calls on 
January 11, between appellant and respondent, appel-
lant decided to pay ALLO • 
.. .... 
The entire r.stionale underlying the concept 
of negotiability would be frustrated, and commerce 
would be halted, if a prospective holder of a nego-
tiable instrument was forced to make an investiga-
tion each time the instrument was negotiated to him 0 
Szczotka vs. Idelson, 39 Cal Reporter 466 (Califor-
nia) on page 471, holds: "The decisions hold that 
a purchaser of negotiable paper before maturity 
need not make inquiry of the makers with respect to 
the consideration therefor and the circumstances 
leading up to the execution.(Witty vs. Clinch, 207 
Ca 1 7 9 8 , 2 7 9 P • 7 9 9) " 
The cases cited in support of appellant's 
proposition that respondent had a duty in inquire, 
are not in pointo The facts of the case of Norman 
vs. Worldwide Distributors, Inc., 202 Pao, super 
193 Au 3d 115 (1963) is distinguishable on its facts 
In that case, the purported holder in due course had 
dealt with the defrauding payees in three different 
situations in which the payees had used different 
names; the holder in due course knew that the refer-I 
ral plan of the payees was closely suspect of being i 
fraudulent; the holder in due course even called the 
maker of the note to disavow any knowledge of the 
purported holder in due course of the fraudulent 
scheme; the note was purchased by the purported hol-
der in due course for a substantial discount, a mat-
ter of days after the execution of the note. In the 1 
case at bar, the record is totally devoid of any 
complicity on the part of the respondent with the 
payee. Appellant even testified that respondent 
was concerned about the ethics in speaking with ap-
pellant (TR 42, line 16). 
In the case cited by appellant of Potter 
Bank and Trust Coo VSo Massey, 11 Misc, 2d 523, 171 
N.Y.S. 2d 27 (1958), the court was faced with a 
statute which is substantially different from 70A-3-
302 (1) (b) U.C.Ao, in 1953, which deals with the 
requisites of a holder in due course. The Utah stat-
ute provides only that the holder must be one "in 
good faith", yet the statute before the court in the 
Potter case provided that the holder must be "in 
good faith including observance of the reasonable 
.£.Q_mmercial standards of any business in which the 
h2_lder may be engaged." When the State of Utah en-
acted the Uniform Commercial Code, it did not include 
the language which is underlined. The Potter court, 
on 11 Misc. 2d 526, states: "Plaintiff argues that 
the words italicized above [the underlined language] 
affected no change in Pennsylvania law, and that, 
under prior decisions, nothing short of .actual know-
ledge or a wilful intent to evade such knowledge will 
constitute lack of good faith. Whether that was 
the law prior to 1953 is not necessary to decide; 
the clear language of the statute ••• ''. Respondent 
herein submits that because of the difference in 
the language between the statute cited in the Potter 
case and the statute enacted in the State of Utah, 
a different result must followo Neither respondent, 
nor, evidently, appellant has been able to find any 
applicable Utah cases on this point. It is there-
fore respectfully submitted that the Utah statute 
when read with the holding of Szczocka vs. Idelson, 
supra, there was no duty. on the part of respondent 
to make an investigation. Even if this Court should 
find that the law of Utah does impose a duty of in-
vestigation, it is respectfully submitted that the 
facts, as reflected by the transcript, in the case 
at bar, are not sufficient so as to place that duty 
upon this respondent. If nothing else, respondent 
had every right to be reassured, upon receiving a 
check dated after respondent's conversations with 
-18-
appellan.:. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial of this suit, before the trial 
Judge, was conducted and tried pursuant to a Stipu-
lation by which defendant had the burden of proof 
of rebutting the presumption that plaintiff was a 
holder in due course and entitled to judgment. 
After hearing defendant'~appellant 1 s) evidence, 
after weighing the credibility of the evidence, 
after examini~g and rejecting the testimony and the 
possible inferences and presumptions arising there-
from, the trial court concluded that defendant did 
not establish a defense and did not rebut plaintiff' 
presumptive prima facie case. 
In answer to appellant's claim that respon-
dent was placed under a duty of inquiry, there is 
ample evidence to support Finding of Fact 1fa2, "that 
plaintiff had no notice of any conditions or cir-
cumstances on or prior to the date that the check 
was negotiated to plaintiff, which would put plain-
c:if f on notice of any infirmities of the check, or 
would likewise impose a duty of inquiry upon plain-
t•cc 11 l .L J... (TR 13) 
It is respectfully submitted that the 
language of the McCollum vs. Clothier case, supra, 
compels this Court to accept the Findings of Fact 
of the trial court, and to affirm the judgment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
-20-
